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"High Crimes and Misdemeanors":
Recovering the Intentions of
the Founders
Gary L. McDowell*
Introduction
The most interesting and important question involved in the constitu-
tional process of impeachment is the meaning of "high Crimes and Misde-
meanors" as understood by those who framed and ratified the Constitution.
What follows is an effort to shed some light on that original meaning and
thereby to provide some guidance to those who must determine if, in the
instant case, the President of the United States has committed impeachable
offenses as that phrase might have been understood by the Founders.
The importance of attempting to answer this question of the Founders'
original intention in creating the impeachment provisions has been under-
scored by the recent open letter from a scholarly coalition calling itself "His-
torians in Defense of the Constitution."' In that letter the historians
correctly point out that the impeachment of any President is "a grave and
momentous step"; but they also insist that the current inquiry is not simply
grave and momentous but "ominous"-an effort to remove this President by
a "novel" and "unprecedented" theory of impeachment.2
The threat posed by this "dangerous new theory of impeachment," the
signatories to the open letter insist, is that it will undermine the basic consti-
tutional principle of separated powers and its attendant system of checks and
balances that truly is our "chief safeguard against abuses of public power."'3
This new view of the impeachment power, they argue, is the result of aban-
doning the intentions of the Founders who "explicitly reserved [impeach-
ment] for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive
power."'4 The crux of the argument is this: "Impeachment for anything else
* Professor of American Studies and Director of the Institute of United States Studies in
the University of London. This version of my written statement submitted on November 9,1998,
to the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Represent-
atives during hearings on "The Background and History of Impeachment" has been slightly ed-
ited to incorporate certain comments made during my oral presentation and further comments
solicited by Congressman William Delahunt.
I am deeply indebted to Raoul Berger, John Bolton, James McClellan, and Brenda Evans
McDoweli for their guidance and assistance in the preparation of this statement on the history
and background of impeachment. I owe a special note of appreciation to Dr. McClellan for
sharing with me his encyclopaedic knowledge of Joseph Story and the common law sources upon
which he depended.
1 Historians in Defense of the Constitution, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 30, 1998, at A17.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 Id.
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would, according to James Madison, leave the President to serve 'during
pleasure of the Senate."' 5
Such serious charges by so many distinguished historians demand a care-
ful consideration of what the Founders meant by "high Crimes and Misde-
meanors": Were they only indictable crimes or did they include what one of
the Framers called "political crimes and misdemeanors?" 6 Were they of-
fenses that a President would commit only in "the exercise of executive
power" or did they also include a President's malfeasance committed in his
private capacity? Were they subject to a reasonably fixed meaning or were
they to be determined simply by the exercise of the "awful discretion" of
those in Congress called upon to impeach and to try impeachments? 7 If it is
true that this new theory of impeachment will indeed "leave the Presidency
permanently disfigured and diminished [and] at the mercy as never before of
the caprices of any Congress,"8 then a return to the proper understanding of
the Founders' intentions will avert nothing less than a constitutional
catastrophe.9
I. Impeachment and Republican Government
The Framers and Ratifiers understood the Constitution's grant to the
House of Representatives of "the sole Power of Impeachment" to be one of
enormous significance for the republican form of government they were cre-
ating.10 The Framers knew that some means of "displacing an unfit magis-
trate [was] rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as
5 Id. It is not at all clear that the historians have given an accurate glimpse of Madison's
view on this matter. His fear that the President could find himself reduced to serving merely
"during pleasure of the Senate" derived from the fact that he thought George Mason's suggested
term "maladministration" was too "vague." It does not follow from that concern that Madison
demanded that impeachment be "explicitly reserved... for high crimes and misdemeanors in
the exercise of executive power." Madison never spoke to this issue and none of his statements
on impeachment and the standards for impeachability seem to suggest that he sought to limit
impeachment to merely abuses in the exercise of executive power. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTnON OF 1787, at 550 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND].
6 See 1 TiE WORKS OF JAMBS WILSON 425 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) [herein-
after WORKS].
7 See THE FEDERAuST No. 65, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
8 Historians in Defense of the Constitution, N.Y. Tnvis, Oct. 30, 1998, at A17.
9 Philip B. Kurland, writing in the constitutional shadows cast by Watergate, argued that
in seeking to "rely only on the words of the Constitution, their purpose and function, and their
history, both before and after their inclusion in the basic document," it is essential that "we...
look not merely to the words of the document, but to what those words meant to those who
wrote them, to the function that they were intended to serve, to the history of their use before,
during, and after their composition." PHILLIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONS'rr-
TION 105, 107-08 (1978).
10 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, el. 5. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that impeach-
ment is the only means granted to the Congress to censure or to punish what Arthur M. Schles-
inger, Jr. has called "presidential delinquency."
The current suggestion that Congress might opt for a censure of the President is to grant to
this body a power not given by the Constitution. Moreover, a mere declaration of censure would
be nothing more than a "slap-on-the-wrist approach" to the problem. See ARrm M. SCHLs-
INGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 411-12 (1973). A motion of censure that would seek
more, such as a fine as punishment, would be strictly unconstitutional because it would be a "bill
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well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen."'" On the other hand, they
were keenly aware of the danger of any process that would make the Presi-
dent "the mere creature of the Legislature."'1 2 Such an arrangement would
constitute nothing less than "a violation of the fundamental principle of good
Government."' 3
It was essential that the arrangements for impeachment be able to resist,
as far as possible, introducing the "malignity of party" into this most serious
of constitutional processes. 14 The dangers were so severe that Thomas Jeffer-
son remained convinced that impeachment constituted "the most formidable
weapon for the purposes of a dominant faction that ever was contrived."' 5
The deepest problems facing those who undertook to create within the Con-
stitution the means of dealing with delinquency in high office stemmed from
the very nature of impeachment. As James Wilson would later put it, "[iun
of attainder," a legislative power to punish that is clearly prohibited by the Constitution. See
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
The most significant precedent for a presidential censure from Congress came during the
administration of Andrew Jackson in the midst of a political battle over the Bank of the United
States. The argument was a classic separation of powers conflict with Congress asserting that it
had the power to control the Secretary of the Treasury when it came to administering the bank
and Jackson insisting that under the constitutional design for a unitary executive such powers
were exclusively those of the President. In a fit of pique, Congress voted to "censure" Jackson;
he responded with a "protest" defending his theory of the office.
The censure was nothing more than a resolution of congressional displeasure with no real
effect. Jackson stood up to his political foes in his protest arguing that the resolution voted by
the Senate was "wholly unauthorized by the Constitution and in derogation of its entire spirit"
Jackson Protests the Senate's Censure, April 15, 1834, in LIBERTY AND JusnTc 153, 153 (James
Morton Smith & Paul L. Murphy eds., rev. ed. 1965) [hereinafter Jackson's Protest]. Should a
President submit to such an action, the power of the presidency would be undermined and, in
effect, transferred to the Senate. The very idea of a censure was "subversive of that distribution
of the powers of government which [the Constitution] has ordained and established, [and] de-
structive of the checks and safeguards by which those powers were intended on the one hand to
be controlled and on the other to be protected." Id. at 155.
Jackson showed that this notion of "censure as a halfway house on the road to impeach-
ment" makes "little sense, constitutional or otherwise." SCHLESINGER, supra, at 33, 412. Jack-
son's logic was "unassailable." See id. at 33. As Professor Schlesinger put it: "The continuation
of a lawbreaker as chief magistrate would be a strange way to exemplify law and order at home
or to demonstrate American probity before the world." Id. at 412. When it comes to serious
presidential wrongdoing, it is either impeachment or nothing.
11 1 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 86.
12 See id.
13 Id. James Wilson summed up the problem best in his law lectures:
The doctrine of impeachments is of high import in the constitutions of free states.
On one hand, the most powerful magistrates should be amenable to the law: on the
other hand, elevated characters should not be sacrificed merely on account of their
elevation. No one should be secure while he violates the constitution and the laws:
every one should be secure while he observes them.
1 WORKS, supra note 6, at 425.
14 See 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF TH FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED By THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787 at 127 (William S. Hein & Co. reprint 1996) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of James Iredell).
15 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 8, 1798), in 8 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 368-69 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1904).
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the United States... impeachments are confined to political characters, to
political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments.' 6
Because impeachment is designed to address "the misconduct of public
men" and their possible "abuse or violation of some public trust" it is inevita-
ble that any impeachment proceeding, especially one that involves the Presi-
dent of the United States, will suffer the propensity to degenerate into the
lowest impulses of party and faction.17 Such proceedings, said Alexander
Hamilton, "will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community,
and to divide it into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to the ac-
cused."'18 As a result, there will always be the danger that "the decision will
be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt."'19
The primary way in which the Founders sought to tame the unruly polit-
ical passions that an impeachment would likely unleash was to divide the
process between the two great houses of the legislature, so that as the House
was given the sole power to impeach, the Senate was given "the sole Power to
try all Impeachments." 20 The Founders deemed that the Senate, constituted
as it was, would be the safest repository for the "awful discretion" that would
have to be exercised by the court trying impeachments, the power "to doom
to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished char-
acters of the community."'21
There was no doubt, however, that the House, in exercising its power to
impeach, would be called upon to exercise a discretion no less awful than that
consigned to the Senate in trying an impeachment. For to be impeached by
the House, even if not convicted and removed by the Senate, would consti-
tute an "indelible reproach"22 on the character of the person in question, and
doom him to "infamy" if not to "perpetual ostracism from the esteem and
confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country."23 The terrible
power to impeach was thus not given without the restrictions deemed neces-
sary to reconcile it with the demands of the separation of powers and the
republican form of government.
When the Americans turned their attention to fashioning procedures for
impeachment they clearly had the history of Great Britain in mind.24 Yet in
the instance of impeachment as in so many other things, the Founders often
saw such historical examples as furnishing "no other light than that of bea-
cons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out
that which ought to be pursued." 5 Although they were willing to borrow
16 1 WoRKs, supra note 6, at 426.
17 See TiH FEDERAusT No. 65, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
18 Id
19 Id. at 440.
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
21 See THE FEDERALiST No. 65, at 441-42 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
22 TaE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 425 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
23 Tam FEDERALIST No. 65, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
24 Alexander Hamilton was explicit in stating the debt to England in Tam FEDERALiST No.
65. See id. at 440; see also RAoUL. BERGER, IM .ACHmNT. THE CoNsTrrTunONAL PROBLEMS
84-85 (1973).
25 ThE FEDERALIs-r No. 37, at 233 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
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from Britain the notion that the lower house ought to "prefer the impeach-
ment" and the upper house would "decide upon it," there was little else from
British experience that made its way into the provisions of the Constitution.
The reason was, as Jefferson noted, that "history shows, that in England, im-
peachment has been an engine more of passion than of justice. '26 The only
other British practice adopted, as will be seen below, was the use of the
phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" in setting a standard for impeacha-
ble offenses.
Unlike impeachment in Britain, the Americans restricted the reach of
the power to "civil officers" thus excluding private citizens; made clear im-
peachment would not be a criminal probess but a political one that did not
demand a trial by jury or permit a presidential pardon; emphasized that im-
peachment was no bar to further prosecutions in the ordinary courts for crim-
inal actions; and established that punishment would extend no further than
removal from office and disqualification from holding office again. By the
time of the Federal Convention it was clear that American thinking about
impeachment had shifted "from the orbit of English precedent to a native
republican course."2 7 The provisions that finally were adopted "reflected in-
digenous experience and revolutionary tenets instead of English tradition." 28
Impeachment was rendered, to borrow a phrase from James Madison, "a re-
publican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. '2 9
The most important restriction placed on the power to impeach was the
catalogue of offenses listed in the Constitution: "The President, Vice Presi-
dent and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.13 0 These words were not mindlessly crafted or
chosen because the Founders thought they were vague and open to endless
interpretation. Rather in this, as in all the other provisions of the Constitu-
tion, the Founders sought to be precise and limiting in the powers granted.
As Rufus King recalled, "it was the intention and honest desire of the Con-
vention to use those expressions that were most easy to be understood and
least equivocal in their meaning."' 31 The reason for this desire for clarity was
rooted in the founding generation's firm belief that a written constitution was
essential to a free, republican government.
H. The Necessity of Recurring to the Intentions of the Founders
Early in the Revolutionary period a consensus began to emerge among
American political leaders that "in all free States the Constitution is fixd"
and that "vague and uncertain laws, and more especially constitutions, are
the very instruments of slavery." 32 Experience had taught the colonists the
26 BERGER, supra note 24, at 79 n.130 (quoting Jefferson).
27 PETER CHARLEs HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA at xi (1984).
28 Id.
29 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
30 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
31 3 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 268.
32 This section draws from Gary L. McDowell, The Language of Law and the Foundations
of American Constitutionalism, 55 Wm. & MARY Q. 375, 396 (1998).
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harsh lesson that governors without restraint could make "mere humour and
caprice" the most fundamental "rule and measure" of the administration of
political power.33 Protection lay in maintaining the "essential Distinction"
between a "civil constitution," which was fundamental, and the form of gov-
ernment and the exercise of its powers, which was not.34
As Americans moved closer to the call for independence, their thinking
about constitutions hardened. For a constitution to be deemed fundamental,
it had to be able to "survive the rude storms of time" and to remain constant,
"however ... circumstances may vary.'"35 The most likely way to achieve
such permanence was to embody the constitution in a "written Charter. '36
And for such charters to serve as a brake on government, it was further nec-
essary that they be "plain and intelligible-such as common capacities are
able to comprehend, and determine when, and how far they are, at any time,
departed from. '37 Constitution draftsmen should take care that "not a single
point.., be subject to the least ambiguity. ' 38 Such a "fixt" constitution was
the only means whereby the people could safely make their way between the"arbitrary claims of Rulers, on one hand, and a lawless license, on the
other.139
In 1787, the Framers thus sought to craft the new Constitution carefully,
pulling their words from sources they believed clear and common. They en-
deavored "to form a fundamental constitution, to commit it to writing, and
place it among their archives, where every one should be free to appeal to its
text."40 They understood that language is the essence of law and that law is
the essence of liberty. At the most basic level, there would be neither place
nor need in such a constitution, as Joseph Story would later point out, for
33 See Letter from Samuel Adams, House of Representatives of Massachusetts, to the
Speakers of Other Houses of Representatives (Feb. 11, 1768), in 1 Ti WRTNGS OF SAMUEL
ADAMS 184, 185 (Henry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1904); Jonathan Mayhew, Concerning Unlimited
Submission and Nonresistance to the Higher Powers, in PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERiCAN REVOLU-
TION 1750-1776, at 215, 241-42 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965).
34 See Berkshire's Grievances (Pittsfield, 1778), in 1 AMERIcAN POLrncAL WRrrIN DUR-
ING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 455, 457 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983) [hereinafter AMERICAN POLrrCAL WRrIG]; Daniel Shute, An Election Sermon, in 1
AMERiCAN POLrICAL WRTNG, supra, at 109, 117; see also Four Letters on Interesting Subjects,
in 1 AMERICAN POLrnCAL WRrnNG, supra, at 368, 385; Philodemus [Thomas Tudor Tucker],
Conciliatory Hints, Attempting, by a Fair State of Matters, to Remove Party Prejudice, in 1 AMERi-
CAN POLrICAL WRrnING, supra, at 606, 627.
35 [Theophilus Parsons], The Essex Result, in 1 AMERICAN POLTCAL W1rrING, supra
note 34, at 480, 491; see also Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced from the Law of
Nature, in 1 AMERICAN POLTCAL WRrr=G, supra note 34, at 565, 567.
36 See Four Letters, supra note 34, at 368, 382.
37 Gad Hitchcock, An Election Sermon, in 1 AMERICAN POLITCAL WRITNG, supra note
34, at 281, 294. This same point was stressed repeatedly. See Rudiments of Law, supra note 35,
at 565, 588-89; John 'ficker, An Election Sermon, in 1 AMERICAN PoLrrCAL WR-G, supra
note 34, at 158, 164.
38 Thomas Jefferson, Albemarle County Instructions Concerning the Virginia Constitution,
in 6 THm PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 284, 286 (1952).
39 Thcker, supra note 37, at 169.
40 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Major John Cartwright (June 5,1824), in 16 THE WRrr-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42,45-46 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903).
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"metaphysical or logical subtleties." 41 A written and ratified constitution of
enumerated and limited powers was to be understood to be the "fundamental
law," the embodiment of "the intention of the people. 42
John Marshall spoke the sense of his generation of Founders when he
insisted that a written constitution was nothing less than "the greatest im-
provement on political institutions." 43 Those who framed such constitutions
took them seriously as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,"
the foundation of all governmental powers delegated by the people by which
those powers would be "defined, and limited."44 Constitutions are written,
Marshall argued, so "that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten."4 5
Such was the logic of his generation that Marshall could presume that any-
thing the people intended to include in their Constitution "they would have
declared... in plain and intelligible language. '46 Thus was the logic of the
Founders that the most fundamental rule of interpretation was to determine
the intention of the lawgiver.47
The evolution in the Federal Convention of the constitutional text con-
cerning impeachable offenses began at the outset when Edmund Randolph
presented the Virginia Plan on May 29, 1787, which included the proposal
that a national judiciary be empowered, among other things, to deal with
"impeachments of any National officers." 48 The issue was considered again
on June 2, when John Dickinson proposed that "the Executive be made re-
movable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Leg-
islatures of individual States. '49 After some discussion, Hugh Williamson of
North Carolina moved to insert in the emerging text the provision that the
chief magistrate "be removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-prac-
tice or neglect of duty."' 50 On June 18, Alexander Hamilton added to the
discussion his view that "[t]he Governour[,] Senators and all officers of the
United States [should] be liable to impeachment for Mal - and corrupt con-
duct; and upon conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for hold-
41 See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 451 (photo. reprint 1994) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1891).
42 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
43 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
44 Id. at 176-77.
45 Id. at 176. As he sketched it:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government,
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is
the basis, on which the whole American fabric had been erected. The exercise of
this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently
repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And
as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are
designed to be permanent.
Id.
46 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
47 In his pseudonymous defense of his opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall was
blunt: "The object of language is to communicate the intention of him who speaks, and the great
duty of a judge who construes an instrument, is to find the intention of its makers." JOHN MAR.
SHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland 168-69 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
48 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 22.
49 Id at 85.
50 Id. at 88.
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ing any place of trust or profit."''s The most substantive discussions on
impeachment occurred on July 19 and 20. By this time the mix of possible
impeachable offenses now included "corruption," schemes of "peculation or
oppression," "loss of capacity," malversation, bribery, treachery, corrupting
his electors, "negligence," and "perfidy. '5 2 The resolution that "the Execu-
tive be removeable on impeachments" carried eight votes to two.53 Through
the entire discussion the primary concern was where to lodge the power to
try impeachments; there seemed a general sense of what would constitute
impeachable offenses.
By the time the issue returned to the floor of the Convention on August
27, the power to impeach had been lodged in the House of Representatives
for "Treason, Bribery or corruption" with the trial to be conducted by the
Supreme Court. But further consideration of the clause was postponed.54 By
September 4, the language was changed to provide for the removal of the
President "on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction
by the Senate, for Treason, or bribery."55 On September 8, the Convention
returned to the problem of impeachment and this time the debate focused on
what were properly impeachable offenses. George Mason thought it impru-
dent that the provision be "restrained to Treason & bribery only" and sug-
gested that the power be expanded to include "maladministration."5 6 His
concern was that treason and bribery were insufficient to reach such political
offenses as the subversion of the Constitution. Madison insisted that "malad-
ministration" was so "vague" a term as to have the effect of reducing the
term of the President "to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate. '5 7 At this
point Mason willingly moved to withdraw the suggested "maladministration"
and substituted "other high crimes & misdemeanors. 58 His motion was ac-
cepted by a vote of eight to three.59
It may well be worth noting that Mason's original proposal for this new
standard of impeachable offenses was for "'other high crimes & misdemean-
ors' <agst. the State'>. '60 This was quickly amended by striking out "State"
after the word "against" and substituting "United States," "in order to re-
move ambiguity."' 61 When the draft from the Committee on Style was laid
before the Convention all references to "high crimes and misdemeanors
against the United States" was dropped in favor of what would become the
version that today appears in the Constitution: "The president, vice-presi-
dent, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes
51 Id. at 292.
52 2 id. at 65-66.
53 Id. at 69.
54 See id. at 427.
55 Id. at 499.
56 1d at 550.
57 Id.
58 Id-
59 See id,
60 Id.
61 Id. at 551.
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and misdemeanors." 62 Thus as finally adopted, the standard of "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors" seems to have a broader, less restricted meaning than
merely a narrow interpretation of crimes against the government. This
meaning seems to reflect the general sense of the Convention that impeach-
ment was intended to reach political abuses, such as maladministration or
malversation, as well as indictable crimes. Moreover, it also seems to under-
mine the claim that impeachment is limited only to what one might call offi-
cial duties and does not reach what Joseph Story would later call simply"personal misconduct. '63
What is most striking about the inclusion of "high Crimes and Misde-
meanors" is how little discussion it caused; there was virtually no debate at
all. One searches in vain in the rest of the records of the Federal Convention,
in the ratifying conventions of the several states, in such obvious writings
during the ratification struggle as The Federalist and the essays written by the
leading Anti-Federalists and "other" Federalist penmen, and in the corre-
spondence among the Founders written at the time. One can only draw the
conclusion that the phrase was indeed one of those expressions, as Rufus
King said, that the Convention adopted because they "were most easy to be
understood and least equivocal in their meaning." 64
What was obviously clear and unequivocal to the Founders has been to
subsequent generations a matter of some confusion. 65 Nowhere has that con-
fusion been more clearly expressed-or the implicit dangers of departing
from the original meaning of the Constitution more powerfully exposed-
than in the argument by then-Congressman Gerald Ford in 1970 during his
quest to impeach Justice William 0. Douglas. In Ford's view (one which,
unfortunately, he continues to espouse) "an impeachable offense is whatever
a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given mo-
ment in history." The reason, said the Republican Congressman, is that
"there are few fixed principles among the handful of precedents. '66 To fol-
62 See id. at 600. It was understood by the Convention that the Committee on Style was
not to make any changes that would alter the sense of the draft being considered. However, the
Committee chairman was Gouverneur Morris for whom the line between simple editorial adjust-
ments and substantive alterations was always a thin one. On this point, see the oral testimony of
Forrest McDonald, November 9, 1998: "Gouverneur Morris, who wrote the final Constitu-
tion... took a number of liberties with the resolutions to the Convention, and when he took too
great a liberty, they checked him. In this instance, they said, okay, we will go along with it."
Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 213 (1998) (testimony of Forrest McDonald).
63 See 1 STORY, supra note 41, § 764. George licknor Curtis observed that the purpose of
impeachment is simply
to ascertain whether cause exists for removing a public officer from office. Such
cause may be found in the fact that, either in the discharge of his office, or aside
from its functions, he has violated a law, or committed what is technically denomi-
nated a crime. But a cause for removal from office may exist where no offense
against positive law has been committed, as where the individual has, from immo-
rality or imbecility or maladministration, become unfit to exercise the office.
2 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY oF THE ORiON, FoRmATIoN, AND ADOPTION oF THE
CoNSTrrtMoN oF THE UNrreD STATES 260-61 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1858).
64 3 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 268.
65 See HoFPER & HULL, supra note 27, at 116-17.
66 As quoted in BERGER, supra note 24, at 53 n.1. More recently, in an October 4, 1998
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low Ford's position would be to, render unlimited precisely what the Founders
sought to limit. The idea that the question of impeachable offenses should be
left simply to the "arbitrary discretion" of those in Congress, Joseph Story
observed,
is so incompatible with the genius of our institutions, that no lawyer
or statesman would be inclined to countenance so absolute a des-
potism of opinion and practice, which might make that a crime at
one time, or in one person, which would be deemed innocent at
another time, or in another person.67
Impeachments are not to be carried out for any reason that may occur to
the House of Representatives; they can only be pursued for "Treason, Brib-
ery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." There is thus an obligation to
determine exactly what "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" meant to those
who framed and ratified the Constitution. For, as Raoul Berger has shown, if
that phrase did indeed have "an ascertainable content at the time the Consti-
tution was adopted, that content furnishes the boundaries of the power. '68
III. English Antecedents
It is helpful in trying to determine the original meaning of "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors" to consider the impeachment provisions of the Constitu-
tion in the context of those other powers either granted or denied by the
Founders that had been associated with impeachment in the English tradi-
tion. In England, impeachment had been both a political and a criminal pro-
cess; it was often used to prosecute high treason; and it was not far removed
from bills of attainder and the corruption of blood as punishments. One of
the Founders' most significant departures from the English way of doing
things was to limit rather severely what would constitute treason and to re-
strict Congress in what punishments it could devise.
In England, treason was a wide-ranging offense intended to put a protec-
tive ring around the monarch.69 In the Constitution of the United States, the
Founders reduced the scope of what Blackstone had called "the highest civil
crime, which (considered as a member of the community) any man can possi-
bly commit"70 to this: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only
in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort."'71 The Founders were too aware of how malleable a crime
treason could become in the hands of a legislature prone to punish political
enemies. So too, did they establish a constitutional standard for determining
guilt in order to convict someone of treason: "No Person shall be convicted
essay in New York Times, Ford continued to insist that Congress is left to fill in the blanks in
what he sees as "those deliberately imprecise words 'high crimes and misdemeanors."' Gerald R.
Ford, The Path Back to Dignity, N.Y. TnEs, Oct. 4, 1998, § 4 (Week in Review), at 15.
67 1 STORY, supra note 41, § 797.
68 BERGER, supra note 24, at 87.
69 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENmiEs *74-93.
70 1d at *75.
71 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
or on Confession in open Court."72
When it came to punishing treason, the Constitution also provides that
Congress could never pass the old English punishment of an "Attainder of
Treason" that would have the effect of inflicting a "Corruption of Blood or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. 73 This restriction
was motivated by the Founders' desire to keep political passions from leading
to charges of crime and severe punishments imposed by the legislature. The
logic of limited power here was the same as that which led the Founders to
prohibit both bills of attainder generally, and ex post facto laws. 74
These concerns were also present in the Founders' decisions regarding
the process of impeachment. As indicated above, it was essential to their way
of thinking to make clear that impeachment was a political process dealing
with political wrongdoing and not a part of the criminal justice process.
Thus, they made clear that punishment for impeachment could not "extend
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy
any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States."75 But they
emphasized that impeachment was not a bar to prosecuting criminal acts that
the person impeached may have committed by noting that "the Party con-
victed [of impeachment] shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict-
ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. '76 Thus, although
an indictable crime may be deemed an impeachable offense, impeachable
offenses are not simply limited to indictable crimes.
To underscore the inherently political nature of impeachment, the Foun-
ders went further and provided that the right to a jury trial was to be secured
for "all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment. '77 When it came to the
President, unlike his powers to interfere with ordinary crimes, the Founders
sought to limit his power to interfere with impeachments. His "Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States" was
granted broadly "except in Cases of Impeachment. ''78
By the restrictions they devised, the Founders made clear that the pro-
cess under the new Constitution was based more on the problems they had
seen operating in English impeachments than on institutional arrangements
they thought they should adopt. "Impeachments, and offenses and offenders
impeachable," James Wilson lectured his students, "come not, in those de-
scriptions, within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence. They are founded on
different principles; are governed by different maxims, and are directed to
different objects. ' 7 9 And it is in light of this understanding that sense can be
made of the Founders' adoption of the term "high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors" from their English forebears.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
75 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
76 Id.
77 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
78 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
79 1 WoRKs, supra note 6, at 324.
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Although there is some disagreement as to when the first impeachment
occurred in English history, it seems reasonably clear that the first one along
recognizably modem lines of procedure was against Michael de la Pole, Earl
of Suffolk, in 1386.80 In any event, the phrase "high crimes and misdemean-
ors" makes its first appearance in the 1386 impeachment of the Earl of Suf-
folk, with its next use occurring in the 1450 impeachment of William de la
Pole, Duke of Suffolk and a descendant of the earlier Michael de la Pole.
The charges of "high crimes and misdemeanors" against Michael de la Pole in
1386 included common law offenses as well as other charges that were more
clearly political in nature. William de la Pole's charge of "high crimes and
misdemeanors" was in addition to several charges of high treason. The "high
crimes and misdemeanors" included "Advising the King to grant liberties
and privileges to certain persons, to the hindrance of the due execution of the
laws," "Procuring offices for persons who were unfit, and unworthy of them,"
and "Squandering away the public treasure."' l From those earliest cases
through the impeachment of Warren Hastings that was occurring at the same
time as the Federal Convention, "high crimes and misdemeanors" continued
to be a common charge in the impeachments that were brought.82
In the mid-seventeenth century the notion of what constituted "high
crimes and misdemeanors" was expanded to include such things as negli-
gence and improprieties while in office. Chief Justice William Scroggs, for
example, was impeached in 1680 for, among other things, browbeating wit-
nesses, cursing and drinking to excess, and generally bringing "the highest
scandal on the public justice of the kingdom. '8 3 By the eighteenth century it
was clear that impeachable offenses under the rubric "high crimes and misde-
meanors" were not limited to indictable crimes in common law but reached
more purely political offenses. In 1701 the Earl of Oxford was charged with
"violation of his duty and trust."84 And Warren Hastings was charged with
maladministration, corruption in office, and cruelty towards the people of
India.85 By the time of the Federal Convention, English law on impeach-
ments was clear that such "misdeeds ... as peculiarly injure the common-
wealth by the abuse of high offices of trust, are the most proper, and have
been the most usual grounds for this kind of prosecution. '8 6
80 The other dates suggested include 1283 and 1376. See 1 WILLIAM S. HoLDswoRTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 380 (3d ed. 1936); ALEx SIMPSON JR., A TREATISE ON FEDERAL
IMPEACHmENTS 5 (1916). See generally BERGER, supra note 24, at 53-73.
81 4 JOHN HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HousE OF COMMONs 60, n.*
(London 1796).
82 For a complete listing of the English impeachments see SIPSON, supra note 80, at 81-
190; and BERGER, supra note 24, at 7-73.
83 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 197, 200 (T.B. Howell ed., London 1816).
84 SIMPSON, supra note 80, at 144.
85 See id. at 168-70.
86 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEw OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 601
(London 1792). Wooddeson, Blackstone's successor as Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford
University, made the obvious point: "It is certain that magistrates and officers intrusted with the
administration of public affairs may abuse their delegated powers to the extensive detriment of
the community, and at the same time in a manner not properly cognizable before the ordinary
tribunals." l at 596.
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In all of the English cases the political nature of the offenses charged in
impeachments was revealed by the use of the word "high" to modify both
"crimes" and "misdemeanors." The use of "high" in "high crimes and misde-
meanors" did not refer to the substantive nature of the offense, that it was a
particularly serious offense, but that it was a "crime or misdemeanor" carried
out against the commonwealth itself. This use of "high" to distinguish crimes
and misdemeanors against the society as a whole derived from its use in dis-
tinguishing "high" treason from "petit" treason.87 Alexander Hamilton sum-
marized this understanding of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" as adopted
by the Federal Convention in his explanation of the impeachment process
created by the Constitution. The objects of impeachment, he noted, "are
those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they re-
late chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself."88
During the Federal Convention, Gouverneur Morris suggested that
those offenses that were to be deemed impeachable "ought to be enumerated
and defined. '89 In a sense, Mason's move to include the phrase "high crimes
and misdemeanors" was an attempt to achieve some sense of definition when
it came to those offenses for which the President, Vice President, and all civil
officers under the new Constitution might be impeached. All of the Foun-
ders understood the political perils involved if Congress was left with a "dan-
gerous latitude of construction" in so important a power.90 Yet, short of a
clear list of impeachable offenses, there had to be some method to ascertain
what, exactly, "high crimes and misdemeanors" might be. The answer was to
be found in the common law itself.91
As has been seen, the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" was one
in common usage in English impeachments for four centuries leading up to
the Federal Convention. It had become a term of legal art, a technical term.
In approaching such terms, John Marshall noted in considering another such
phrase, the interpretive process is simple:
It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country
whose language is our language, and whose laws form the substra-
87 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *75, *203.
88 THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). Holds-
worth has argued that
the greatest services rendered by this procedure [of impeachment] to the cause of
constitutional government have been, firstly the establishment of the doctrine of
ministerial responsibility to the law, secondly its application to all ministers of the
crown, and, thirdly and consequently the maintenance of the supremacy of the law
over all.
HoLDswoRTH, supra note 80, at 382.
89 2 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 65.
90 See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 50 (statement of Timothy Bloodworth in the
North Carolina ratifying convention).
91 See WILLIAM RAwLE, A ViEw OF THE CONsTrrrIToN OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 210 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) ("Impeachments are.., introduced
as a known definite term, and we must have recourse to the common law of England for the
definition of them.").
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turn of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not
employed by the framers of our constitution in the sense which had
been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it.92
Joseph Story made the best case for the common law construction of
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" in his Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States.93 In Story's view the necessity of recourse to the common
law to shed light on the meaning of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
stemmed from the nature of impeachment, which has an
enlarged operation, and reaches what are aptly termed political of-
fences, growing out of personal misconduct or gross neglect, or
usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests, in the dis-
charge of the duties of political office. These are so various in their
character, and so indefinable in their actual involutions, that it is
almost impossible to provide systematically for them by positive
law. They must be examined upon very broad and comprehensive
principles of public policy and duty.94
When it came to the details set forth in the Constitution, it was clear that
there was no need to turn to the common law for a definition of treason;
whatever it may have meant in the common law, that meaning was super-
seded by the definition the Founders spelled out in the Constitution itself.
But in the case of the other named offense, bribery, which the Constitution
does not define, said Story, it is clear that "resort [was] naturally and neces-
sarily had to the common law... [which] as the common basis of our juris-
prudence, can alone furnish the proper exposition of the nature and limits of
this offence." 95 As with "bribery" so also must the common law be consulted
with respect to "high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
It is because such "political offences are of so various and complex a
character, so utterly incapable of being defined or classified, that the task of
positive legislation would be impracticable, if it were not almost absurd to
92 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 59, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693). This view of
the relationship between the common law and those common law terms that the Founders ex-
plicitly adopted has continued to inform the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The provisions of the Constitution "are framed in the language of the English common
law, and are to be read in light of its history." Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888). The
Constitution "must be interpreted in light of the common law, the principles and history of
which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution." United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898).
The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference
to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument
was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who sub-
mitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen States, were born and
brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its
vocabulary. They... expressed [their conclusions] in terms of the common law,
confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.
Ex Parle Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925). I am much indebted for these citations to BER-
GER, supra note 24, at 203 n.51.
93 See STORY, supra note 41.
94 lid.§ 764.
95 1d § 796.
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attempt it."'96 The choice, short of a legislative list, was either to resort to"parliamentary practice and the common law" or be doomed to the "arbi-
trary discretion of the Senate. ' 97 To Story, there was no question how to
proceed: "The only safe guide in such cases must be the common law, which
is the guardian at once of private rights and public liberties."98 Like Mar-
shall, Story did not suggest that the common law was a source of "a jurisdic-
tion not given by the Constitution or laws" but that it was simply the "great
basis of American jurisprudence." 99 As a result, it was not only prudent but
appropriate to use the common law "as a guide and check and expositor in
the administration of the rights, duties, and jurisdiction conferred by the
Constitution and laws."' '1 °
The most basic sources of the common law included the great treatises
upon which the early Americans had depended for their legal learning. That
generation of Founders thus moved easily amongst such authorities as Sir
Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644) and Reports
(1600-1615); Sir Thomas Wood's An Institute of the Laws of England (1720);
Richard Wooddeson's A Systematical View of the Laws of England (1792-94);
William Hawkins's A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1717); and a variety
of other tracts such as John Selden's Of the Judicature in Parliaments (1681),
Giles Jacob's A New Law Dictionary (1729), and William Paley's Principles
of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785). But the most dominant source of
authority on the common law for those who wrote and ratified the Constitu-
tion was Sir William Blackstone and his justly celebrated Commentaries on
the Laws of England (1765-69), described by Madison in the Virginia ratify-
ing convention as nothing less than "a book which is in every man's hand."''1 1
Blackstone made clear that of the "high misdemeanors" under English
law, the
first and principal one is the mal-administration of such high of-
ficers, as are in public trust and employment. This is usually pun-
ished by the method of parliamentary impeachment; wherein such
penalties, short of death, are inflicted, as to the wisdom of the house
of peers shall seem proper; consisting usually of banishment, impris-
onment, fines, or perpetual disability. 1°2
Although Blackstone did not speak of "high crimes and misdemeanors"
in any thorough fashion, he did devote a considerable section of the Com-
mentaries to "Public Wrongs," in which he defined public wrongs simply as"crimes and misdemeanors.' ' 10 3 His definition bears a striking resemblance
to Hamilton's discussion of impeachable offenses in The Federalist.
96 Id. § 797.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. § 799.
100 Id. § 798.
101 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 14, at 501.
102 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *121.
103 Id. at *1.
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[P]ublic wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and vio-
lation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community,
considered as a community, in it's social aggregate capacity ....
[C]rimes... besides the injury done to individuals.... strike at the
very being of society; which cannot possibly subsist, where actions
of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity.1' 4
Of greatest interest for trying to understand how these grave offenses
against the commonwealth might be included within the phrase "high Crimes
'and Misdemeanors" is Blackstone's chapter entitled "Of Offenses Against
Public Justice."'105
In that chapter Blackstone explained that "of offenses against public jus-
tice, some... [are] felonious, whose punishment may extend to death; others
only misdemeanors.' 01 6 He then set out to catalogue those offenses against
public justice by beginning "with those that are most penal, and descend[ing]
gradually to such as are of less malignity."'1 7 All of these offenses fall short
of treason, "the highest civil crime... any man can possibly commit," but
share with that most serious offense the fact that each constitutes an assault
on the "common-wealth, or public polity of the kingdom."'' 08 Included in
Blackstone's catalogue are offenses against public justice that may shed some
light on the questions currently confronting the House of Representatives as
to the nature and extent of any impeachable offenses committed by the Presi-
dent in the present inquiry.
There are two offenses of special relevance in determining if the Presi-
dent has indeed committed "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The third
item in Blackstone's list is "obstructing the execution of lawful process."
"This," says the author, "is at all times an offence of a very high and pre-
sumptuous nature .... 109 Such obstructions of public justice, he argues, can
be of both "the civil and criminal kind."110 Although his primary example is
of obstruction of an arrest upon a criminal process, the offense is clearly not
limited to that and seems to include any effort to keep the processes of the
law from functioning properly."'
The second offense of some significance to the matter at hand "is the
crime of wilful and corrupt perjury; which is defined by Sir Edward Coke, to
be a crime committed when a lawful oath is administered, in some judicial
proceeding, to a person who swears willfully, absolutely, and falsely, in a mat-
ter material to the issue or point in question. 11 2 Materiality lies in whether
the false testimony is essential to the determination of the issue at hand or
merely related to "some trifling collateral circumstance, to which no regard is
104 Id. at *5.
105 See iUi at *127-141.
106 I& at *128.
107 IdL
108 ML at *75, *127.
109 Id. at *129.
110 Id.
111 See id.
112 Id. at *137 (footnote omitted).
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paid. 11 3 Closely related in Blackstone's account to perjury proper is the
"Subornation of perjury [which] is the offence of procuring another to take
such a false oath, as constitutes perjury in the principal." 114 Blackstone
found perjury and subornation of perjury to be crimes both odious and "de-
testable," but far from being capital offenses.115 Although at one point such
offenses were punishable by death, it had since Elizabethan days been "pun-
ished with six months imprisonment, perpetual infamy, and a fine... or to
have both ears nailed to the pillory. 11 6 In attempting to understand where
perjury comes in the descending order Blackstone sets up, and how it might
thus fit into an understanding of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" based
upon the common law, it is striking that perjury is followed immediately by
the crime of bribery.117 The fact that Blackstone deemed perjury to be a
more serious offense against public justice than bribery would not have been
lost on the Founders. The possibility that perjury by a high civil officer might
indeed be an impeachable offense under "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
merits a more thorough consideration.
IV. Oaths and Perjury
The use of oaths in legal proceedings in which evidence is given is an
ancient part of the common law. Sir Edward Coke noted that the "word oath
is derived from the Saxon word eoth."1 s8 The oath is nothing less, said Coke,
than "an affirmation or deniall by any Christian of anything lawfull and hon-
est, before one or more, that have the authority to give the same for advance-
ment of truth and right, calling Almighty God to witnesse, that his testimony
is true."119 Yet there is evidence that the use of oaths extends back to Roman
times when the law of the Twelve Tables provided that "Whoever gives false
evidence must be thrown from the Tarpeian rock."'120 And Cicero in De Of-
ficiis argues that
in taking an oath it is our duty to consider not what one may have to
fear in case of violation but wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an
113 Id.
114 Id. at *137-38.
115 See id. at *139.
116 Id. at *138.
117 See id. at *139.
118 EDWARDO COKE, Tim THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 164
(London 1817).
119 Id. This view has been expanded upon by John Wigmore in his treatise on evidence in
which he notes that the idea of an oath came from Germanic law: "The employment of oaths
takes our history back to the origins of Germanic law and custom where, as in all early civiliza-
tions, the appeal to the supernatural plays an important part in the administration of justice." 6
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRALuS AT COMMON LAW § 1815 (Chadbourne rev.
1976). James Bradley Thayer observed that the "Normans... found that much of what they
brought [to England] was there already; for the Anglo-Saxons were their cousins of the Ger-
manic race, and had, in a great degree, the same legal conceptions and methods, only less
worked out." James B. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial, 5 HARV. L. REV. 45, 45 (1891). This
extended to the use of oaths. See id. at 58.
120 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 11
(London, MacMillan & Co.1883).
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assurance backed by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given,
as before God as one's witness, is to be sacredly kept.121
As Samuel Pufendorf emphasized, oaths were not simply the preserve of
Christians:
An Oath the very Heathens look'd on as a thing of so great Force,
and of so sacred Authority, that they believ'd the Sin of Perjury to
be pursued with the severest Vengeance; such as extended itself to
the Posterity of the Offender, and such as might be incurr'd by the
bare Thought and Inclination, without the Act.122
The significance of the oath in courts of law was explained by James
Wilson in his law lectures:
The courts of justice, in almost every age, and in almost every coun-
try, have had recourse to oaths, or appeals to heaven, as the most
universal and the most powerful means to engage men to declare
the truth. By the common law, before the testimony of a witness
can be received, he is obliged to swear, that it shall be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 23
The purpose, Wilson concluded, is to secure truthful evidence:
Belief is the end proposed by evidence of every kind. Belief in testi-
mony is produced by the supposed veracity of him who delivers it.
The opinion of his veracity ... is shaken, either when, in former
instances, we have known him to deliver testimony which has been
false; or when, in the present instance, we discover some strong in-
ducement which may prevail on him to deceive. 24
Wilson took his moral and historical bearings on the necessity of oaths to
getting at the truth from William Paley whose Principles of Moral and Polit-
ical Philosophy was an influential work of considerable prominence among
the early Americans.123 Wilson praised Paley as an authority of "high reputa-
tion," a "sensible and ingenious writer" who was "no undiscerning judge of
the subject" of the administration of justice.126 Joseph Story was similarly
impressed with Paley as a writer of "practical sense" whose analyses of polit-
121 CICERO, DE OFFicis 383 (Walter Miller trans., Harvard University Press 1990).
122 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 333 (Basil Kennet trans.,
London, 4th ed. 1729).
123 2 WoRKs, supra note 6, at 703-04. Wilson was not alone in his view of the importance of
oaths. For example, Justice Jacob Rush, the brother of Benjamin Rush, expressed views much
like those of Wilson: "An oath is a very serious transaction [the nature of which] is the solemn
appeal to God-it is engaging to speak the truth, and calling upon him to witness our sincerity,
that constitute the oath and obligation." A Charge, delivered by Judge Rush, at Easton Court,
on the 8th Sept. 1796, to the Grand Jury of the County of Northampton, in Pennsylvania, in 2
AmmucAN POLITICAL WxrrNG, supra note 34, at 1015, 1017. It is thus important that civil
society maintains a due attention to "the religious sentiment upon which an oath is founded"; to
allow that sentiment to relax will be "injurious to society." ld at 1018.
124 2 WoRKs, supra note 6, at 704.
125 See WILLiAM PALEY, THE PRINcIPLEs oF MoRAL AND PoLmCAL PHILOsoPHY
(London, 5th ed. 1788).
126 1 WoRKs, supra note 6, at 240, 310, 325.
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ical institutions displayed "great skill and ingenuity of reasoning."'127
Throughout his celebrated Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States, Story relies often on the "excellent writings" of Paley.28
For Paley, the issue of oaths and perjury was one of morality as well as
of law; he expressed views not unlike that of Cicero who warned that "people
overturn the fundamental principles established by Nature, when they di-
vorce expediency from moral rectitude."'1 29 In Paley's view, the entire ques-
tion of perjury rested on the definition of a lie: "A lie is a breach of promise:
for whoever seriously addresses his discourse to another, tacitly promises to
speak the truth, because he knows that the truth is expected.' 130 And the
effects of lying are not simply private; they are public in the deepest and most
important sense:
[T]he direct ill consequences of lying .. .consist, either in some
specific injury to particular individuals, or in the destruction of that
confidence, which is essential to the intercourse of human life: for
which latter reason, a lie may be pernicious in its general tendency,
and therefore criminal, though it produce no particular visible mis-
chief to any one.131
Given this public aspect to the damages that come from lying, it is neces-
sary that oaths never be made "cheap in the minds of the people."'132 Be-
cause "[m]ankind must trust to one another" there is no more efficacious
means than through the use of oaths: "Hence legal adjudications, which gov-
ern and affect every right and interest on this side of the grave, of necessity
proceed and depend upon oaths."'1 33 As a result, lying under oath is far more
serious than merely lying; perjury is, Paley notes, "a sin of great delibera-
tion," an act that "violates a superior confidence."'1 34
Because a witness swears that he will "'speak the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, touching the matter in question,"1 35 there is no
place where a person under oath can cleverly lie and not commit perjury.
The witness cannot legitimately conceal "any truth, which relates to the mat-
ter in agitation" because to so conceal "is as much a violation of the oath, as
to testify a positive falsehood; and this whether the witness be interrogated to
that particular point or not."'1 36 It is not enough, Paley observed, for the
witness afterward to say that he was not forthcoming "'because it was never
asked me'";137 an oath obliges to tell all one knows whether asked or not. As
Paley notes, "the law intends ... to require of the witness, that he give a
complete and unreserved account of what he knows of the subject of the trial,
127 1 STORY, supra note 41, §§ 588 n.1, at 436, 585 n.2, at 439.
128 See id § 1603; see also id. §§ 522, 548, 558, 573, 576, 580, 582, 585, 588; 2 id. § 1338.
129 CicERo, supra note 121, at 379.
130 1 PALEY, supra note 125, at 184.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 193.
133 Id. at 197.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 200.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 201.
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whether the questions proposed to him reach the extent of his knowledge or
not."138
Nor is it a sufficient excuse that "[a] point of honour, of delicacy, or of
reputation, may make a witness backward to disclose some circumstance with
which he is acquainted.' ' 39 Such a sense of shame or embarrassment cannot
"justify his concealment of the truth, unless it could be shewn, that the law
which imposes the oath, intended to allow this indulgence to such
motives."140
Similarly, linguistic contortions with the words used cannot legitimately
conceal a lie or, if under oath, perjury. Paley's argument on this point merits
a complete hearing:
As there may be falsehoods which are not lies, so there may be lies
without literal or direct falsehood. An opening is always left for this
species of prevarication, when the literal and grammatical significa-
tion of a sentence is different from the popular and customary
meaning. It is the wilful deceit that makes the lie; and we wilfully
deceive, when our expressions are not true in the sense in which we
believe the hearer apprehends them. Besides, it is absurd to con-
tend for any sense of all words, in opposition to usage, for all senses
of words are founded upon usage, and upon nothing else.141
Thus the most common terms of oaths sworn include a promise not only
to tell the truth, but the broader promise to tell the whole truth and nothing
but the truth. Willful deceit is the key to whether a witness commits perjury
or not, whatever the means chosen.142 The moral and legal inheritance of the
founding generation included the belief that the violation of an oath was
nothing less than "treachery."' 43
None of the major writers with whom the Founders were intimately con-
versant saw perjury as anything but one of the most serious offenses against
the commonwealth. 144 In his widely cited Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown,
for example, William Hawkins explained that there were certain kinds of of-
fenses that were "infamous, and grosly scandalous, proceeding from Princi-
ples of downright Dishonesty, Malice or Faction";145 and it was under this
138 Id.
139 Id-
140 Id.
141 Id- at 188-89. Pufendorf was of a similar mind. Witnesses, he said, should not "have an
opportunity, by insidious or equivocal Expressions, to evade the force of [their] Obligation[s]."
PuNDoPRF, supra note 122, at 337. Should they so break their oath, they will discover the truth
that God is the "Avenger of our Perjury." See id. at 335.
142 As Thomas Wood put it, "it cannot be presum'd that one should commit Perjury with-
out design." THOMAS WOOD, A NEW INsTrrTE OF TH IMPERIAL OR CIviL LAW 288 (London,
4th ed. 1730).
143 See ALGERNON SiDNEY, DIscouRsEs CONCERNING GovERnENTMr 225 (Thomas West
ed., 1990).
144 For a helpful compilation of many of the common law sources on "oaths" and "perjury"
see under those heads in GrLEs JACOB, A NEw LAW DICrIONARY (Owen Ruffhead & 3. Morgan
eds., London, 9th ed. 1772).
145 1 WILLIAM HAWKINs, A TREAniSE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CRowN 171 (London, 2d ed.
1724).
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rubric that he included "perjury and subornation of perjury." Indeed he
went further arguing that "perjury... is of all Crimes whatsoever the most
Infamous and Detestable. '146
Perjury was, in the first instance, tied to jurors who might give a false
verdict and "for several centuries no trace is to be found of the punishment
of witnesses for perjury."147 And even after it originated in the Star Cham-
ber, it was only by "slow degrees [that] the conclusion that all perjury in a
judicial proceeding is a crime was arrived at."'148 In 1562-1563 the first statute
providing penalties for those who committed both perjury and subornation of
perjury was enacted.149 Thus human punishments were made to augment the
fear of divine vengeance for lying under oath.150 This was, in Pufendorf's
view, absolutely essential, as he noted by quoting Demosthenes: "Those who
escape your Justice, leave to the Vengeance of the Gods; but those on whom
you can lay hands, never consign over to Providence, without punishing them
your selves."'151 It was by this joint power of the sacred and the secular that
men could put their faith in oaths as a means of securing truthful testimony
from those sworn to give it. And by such oaths and the punishments to be
meted out for perjury, the commonwealth could secure the proper adminis-
tration of justice within the courts of law. Perjury was no longer just a sin; it
was a crime.
Based on the foregoing analysis and review of the historical record, the
conclusion seems inescapable, based on the expressed intent of the Framers,
the wording of the Constitution, the writings of the principal legal authorities
known to the Framers, and the common law, that perjury would certainly be
included as a "high crime and misdemeanor" in an impeachment trial under
the U.S. Constitution. Further, the record fails to support the claim that im-
peachable offenses are limited to only those abuses that occur in the official
exercise of executive power.
Conclusion
There is no power granted to the House of Representatives more formi-
dable than "the sole power of impeachment." Knowing as they did the dan-
gers of subjecting those in high office to the mere passion and caprice of the
moment, the Founders sought to create a power to impeach that would be
capable of "displacing an unfit magistrate"' 52 but within the confines of a
written and ratified Constitution of enumerated and limited powers. They
146 Id. at 172. Pufendorf put it even more strikingly: "Perjury appears to be a most mon-
strous Sin, in as much as by it the forsworn Wretch shews, that he at the same time contemns the
Divine, and yet is afraid of human Punishment; that he is a daring Villain towards God, and a
sneaking Coward towards Men." PUFENDORF, supra note 122, at 334.
147 3 STEPHEN, supra note 120, at 242.
148 Id. at 247.
149 See 4 HoLDswoRTH, supra note 80, at 518.
150 "The two expedients of the oath and the perjury penalty are similar in their operation;
that is, they influence the witness subjectively against conscious falsification, the one by re-
minding him of ultimate punishment by a supernatural power, the other by reminding him of
speedy punishment by a temporal power." 6 WiGMORE, supra note 119, § 1815, at 432.
151 PuFENnoRu, supra note 122, at 334.
152 1 FARRAND, supra note 5, at 86.
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thus limited the reasons for which an impeachment could be undertaken to
"Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors."
The success of the Founders in creating the impeachment power to be
both politically safe and constitutionally effective in meeting the demands of
republican government is seen most clearly in how few have been the in-
stances of its use. Lord Bryce described the power of impeachment over a
century ago as "the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional arsenal"
and thus "unfit for ordinary use."'1 53 The process seeking to remove a Presi-
dent, he said, "is like a hundred-ton gun which needs complex machinery to
bring it into position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it, and a large
mark to aim at."'5 4 The constitutional provisions for impeachment were in-
tended, in part, to secure the chief executive from being driven from office
for mere partisan reasons. To get rid of a President-or to try to-Congress
must have good cause. As Bryce said, one does not use impeachment for
light and transient causes, "as one does not use steam hammers to crack
nuts."'5 5
In light of the Founders' concern that the President not be subject to
political molestation by Congress, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that
impeachment is the only means granted to Congress to censure or to punish"presidential delinquency." When it comes to serious presidential wrongdo-
ing, it is either impeachment or nothing. The current suggestion that Con-
gress might censure the President assumes a power not given by the
Constitution and thus violates one of the Constitution's most basic principles,
the separation of powers.
The Founders understood better than do many today that the most po-
tentially pernicious branch of our constitutional order is the legislature. As
James Madison correctly observed in The Federalist No. 48, history had
demonstrated that the "legislative department is every where extending the
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.' 56
The reason this is a danger, Madison noted, is that a legislature is all too
often "inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid con-
fidence in its own strength."'1 57 Thus, Madison concluded, "it is against the
enterprising ambition of this department, that the people ought to indulge all
their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.' 158
A primary reason for the Founders' efforts to curb the tendency of Con-
gress to draw all power into its "impetuous vortex" was to protect the execu-
tive branch from being molested by it. Those who framed and ratified the
Constitution had seen in their own state constitutions the debilitating effect
of having a dominant legislature and a servile executive. By establishing a
clear separation of powers and by giving each branch the means of resisting
the encroachments of the others, they sought to create that energy in the
executive that they deemed essential to good government. Alexander Hamil-
153 1 JAMES BRYCE, Tam AMEmIcAN CommoNwA LTH 212 (MacMillan 1941) (1893).
154 Id.
155 1& at 213.
156 THa FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
157 Id. at 334.
158 Id.
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ton summed it up powerfully in The Federalist No. 70: "A feeble executive
implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but an-
other phrase for a bad execution; And a government ill executed, whatever it
may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government."1 59
Recognizing as they did that "[e]nlightened statesmen [would] not al-
ways be at the helm,' 160 the Founders also knew there had to be some means
available to remove from office those who might violate their sacred public
trust and abuse their positions. But such a means had to be created within
the context of the necessary separation of the coordinate powers. The solu-
tion was giving the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representa-
tives and giving the sole power to try such impeachments to the Senate. By
such a device the principle of a bicameral legislature would temper the im-
pulses of the legislature to censure and to punish those with whom the most
numerous branch might disagree.
Andrew Jackson understood well the unconstitutionality of a censure.
The very idea of a censure, he wrote, is "subversive of that distribution of the
powers of government which [the Constitution] has ordained and established,
[and] destructive of the checks and safeguards by which those powers were
intended on the one hand to be controlled and the other to be protected." It
was for this reason that Jackson argued, as should Congress, that censure was"wholly unauthorized by the Constitution and in derogation of its entire
spirit." Jackson's logic was, as Arthur Schlesinger has said, "unassailable.' 16'
Impeachment is the only power the Constitution grants to Congress to
deal with errant executives. It is the only means whereby the necessarily high
walls of separation between the two branches may be legitimately scaled.
Had the Founders intended some other means of punishment to be available
to the legislative branch they would have said so, as Chief Justice John Mar-
shall once said in another context, "in plain and intelligible language.' 62
That they did not do so should be the only guide in this grave and sensitive
matter.
The temptation to do anything possible to avoid exercising the awful
constitutional power of impeachment is obviously and understandably great.
But such a temptation to take the easy way out by assuming a power not
granted should be shunned. Should President Clinton, as a result of bad ad-
vice or political pressure, agree to such an unconstitutional punishment as a
censure, that would be a breach of his constitutional obligations as great as
anything else of which he has been accused. The great office he is privileged
to hold deserves his protection against any ill-considered censorious assault
from Congress.
In short, censure would be a coward's way out, both for those in Con-
gress who might suggest it and any President who would accept it. Impeach-
ment is the only legitimate power available to Congress by grant of the
159 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
160 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
161 For a more complete discussion of this point, and for the citations to the quotations
mentioned here, see supra note 10.
162 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
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Constitution to deal with presidential wrongdoing. Neither a President nor
the American people should accept anything less.
In the end, the determination of whether presidential misconduct rises to
the level of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," as used by the Framers, is left
to the discretion and deliberation of the House of Representatives. No small
part of that deliberation, guided as it must be by the history and meaning of
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors," must address what effect the exercise of
this extraordinary constitutional sanction would have on the health of the
Republic, as weighed against the necessity of making clear that in America
no one-not even a popular President-is above the law. In the end, that is
what matters most and must bear most heavily on the members of the House
of Representatives as they consider what they must do in the weeks ahead.
For what is decided-one way or the other will echo through our history.
